On Fri, 2017-11-17 at 08:34 +0100, Michael Ströder wrote:
William Brown wrote:
Just want to point out there are some security risks with ssf
settings.
I have documented these here:
https://fy.blackhats.net.au/blog/html/2016/11/23/the_minssf_trap.ht
ml
Nice writeup. I always considered SSF values to be naive and somewhat
overrated. People expect too much when looking at these numbers -
especially regarding the "strength" of cryptographic algorithms which
changes over time anyway with new cryptanalysis results coming up.
Personally I always try to implement a TLS-is-must policy and prefer
LDAPS (with correct protocol and ciphersuites configured) over
LDAP/StartTLS to avoid this kind of pre-TLS leakage.
Yes, I deliberately ignore "LDAPS is deprecated". ;-]
I agree. If only there was a standards working group that could
deprecate startTLS in favour of TLS .... :)
Furthermore some LDAP server implementation (IIRC e.g. MS AD) refuse
to
accept SASL/GSSAPI bind requests sent over TLS-secured channel. Which
is
IMO also somewhat questionable.
Yes, I really agree. While a plain text port exists, data leaks are
possible. We should really improve this situation, where we have TLS
for all data to prevent these mistakes.
I think a big part of the issue is that GSSAPI forces the encryption
layer, and can't work via an already encrypted channel. The people I
know involved in this space are really resistant to changing this due
to the "kerberos centric" nature of the products.