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Re: Slapd Security based on port

Howard Chu wrote:
Ondrej Kuznik wrote:
Hash: SHA1

On 02/14/2011 08:49 PM, Chris Jackson wrote:
here is a scenario:

Site has a ldap server on ldap://389.  Firewall blocks access to 389
from internet.  Everyone queries the ldap via anonymous binds.  Site
would like to allow staff the ability to  query the ldap from outside
the firewall.  This would be done via ldaps:// 636 to users who have
authenticated via username/password.  They do not want to allow
anonymous queries outside the firewall.

Using the "disallow bind_anon" would prevent anon binds on both ldap://
and ldaps://.  This would break the inside machines ability to query.
  If we dont use "disallow bind_anon" then machines outside of the
firewall could query the ldap.

---Is the only option for them to setup two separate ldap servers?  One
with "disallow bind_anon" and one without.  Then only open the firewall
for port 636 to the ldap server which has "disallow bind_anon".

Another option than ACL magic:
Wouldn't the x-mod= option to the listening socket, as described in the
slapd manpage, help? (slapd -h ldap:/// ldaps:///????x-mod=-rw-------)
I have never used it, though, and the manpage says you have to
explicitly enable it at compile time.

Internet sockets don't have Unix permission bits. The x-mod extension is only for ldapi:// (Unix domain) sockets.

Actually, if compiled with SLAP_X_LISTENER_MOD, slapd honors Unix-like permissions at the backend selection level, much like otherwise enforced backend restrictions, on a listener basis. Probably, a unified feature exploitation configuration would allow to restrict to listeners in a more configurable manner (right now, listener permissions modifications require to restart the server).