Am Sonntag, 23. August 2009 19:29:28 schrieb Josh.Mullis@cox.com: > ..."If the client does not send a certificate, it can still connect." > > > Does that mean that traffic is still encrypted if a certificate is not > used? Yes, it does. One would commonly expect because of the typical HTTPS behaviour that only the server has to authenticate itself, i.e. provide a valid, signed certificate. However, the server may also ask the client to authenticate itself with a valid certificate. In such cases, the administrator has set up a public key/certificate infrastructure. This is common e.g. with (Open-) VPN, where not password logins, but certificates are the recommended way of establishing a authenticated, authorized tunnel. OpenLDAP behaves in a similar way, thus "tlsverifyclient allow" triggers the behaviour one knows from a typical HTTPS browser session. -- Eric > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Emmanuel Dreyfus <firstname.lastname@example.org> > To: Mullis, Josh (CCI-Atlanta); email@example.com > <firstname.lastname@example.org> Sent: Sun Aug 23 02:59:05 2009 > Subject: Re: tlsverifyclient security implications > > Josh Mullis <email@example.com> wrote: > > What are the security implications concerning the following setting in > > slapd.conf: > > tlsverifyclient allow > > As far as I understand, if the client sends a certificate, then slapd > can use it to map client to a LDAP DN, like this: > authz-regexp cn=foo uid=foo,dc=example,dc=net > > If the client does not send a certificate, it can still connect. >
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