Guillaume Rousse wrote:I guess it is just a phrasing issue, and the doc means 'take care users don't inadvertly rewrite their password attribute with a true password instead of keeping this pointer'.Hello list.
Reading http://www.openldap.org/doc/admin24/security.html#SASL password storage scheme, I understand autentication can be delegated to an external mechanisme. Such as, for instance, a kerberos server. In this case, it is advised to prevent changing passwords in the directory.
That part of the doc appears to be wrong. slapd will call SASL's setpass function to change a SASL password, so there's no reason to prevent changing passwords via LDAP.
Also, the {KERBEROS} delegation scheme has been removed, only SASL delegation is supported.
What happens if the autentication provider is an heimdal server, using OpenLDAP as its backend, and smbkrb5 overlay to keep ldap, samba and kerberos password synced ? Does pass-through still work ?
When using the smbk5pwd overlay in such a configuration, there is no pass-through. The Kerberos credentials reside in slapd and slapd validates the authentication directly.
Only if you use the {SMBKRB5} redirection, or even if you use a {SASL} one ?Out of my control, unfortunatly (otherwise, those servers wouldn't use centOs at all :P). Anyway, it doesn't really hurt, it will just make those servers from a specific department unable to autenticate users from other department, not their own ones.I know smbkrb5 has a special {smbkrb5} password storage scheme for redirecting autentication against kerberos password internally, not relying on a external SASL process. But it's only usable if smbkrb5 overlay is available (some of our slaves servers are centos-based, and don't have this overlay, but still need to autenticate users).
You can always obtain the source tree that was used to build your distro and compile the overlay yourself.
Yes, if you use an normal attribute change operation. I don't think there is a way to use an extended password change operation, and bypass this value. Anyway, it doesn't matter very much either, only sysadmins are suposed to take care of administrative accounts.And the trick of setting password-hash directive in slapd.conf to {smbkrb5} to prevent overwriting of userPassword attribute on PasswordChange operation with a normal value has the drawback than even pure ldap administrative accounts (syncrepl, for instance) get redirected to kerberos password for autentication, whereas only our users have principals currently.
The password_hash setting in slapd.conf is only a default. You can explicitly set any hash type on any account.
Let's to summarize what's I'm understanding so far.
Am I correct ? -- Guillaume Rousse Moyens Informatiques - INRIA Futurs Tel: 01 69 35 69 62