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Re: Unix auth via LDAP & now need to add Samba!
- To: OpenLDAP Mailling List <openldap-software@OpenLDAP.org>
- Subject: Re: Unix auth via LDAP & now need to add Samba!
- From: "Mark H. Wood" <mwood@IUPUI.Edu>
- Date: Wed, 1 May 2002 08:51:22 -0500 (EST)
- In-reply-to: <Pine.LNX.email@example.com>
On Tue, 30 Apr 2002, David Wright wrote:
> I don't really see any way around this, if you are going to do
> challenge-response authentication. The server needs the cleartext (or
> equivilent) password in order to use it as salt to hash the challenge, the
> result of which it will compare with the client's response.
No, why would it need the original password? Here's how you do it:
o When account password is set, concatenate with known salt (constant or
easily calculable from nonsensitive data) and hash the result. Store
as "hashed password" (let's call this HPS).
o When client requests connection, generate a challenge and send it.
o Client concatenates password given by user with same known salt and
applies same hash, yielding HPC.
o Client concatenates challenge with HPC and hashes the result, yielding
"hashed challenge" (HCC). Client sends HCC to server.
o Server concatenates challenge with HPS and hashes the result, yielding
o If HCC == HCS then the probability is very high that the user knows the
password. Yet the password itself has never been stored.
> Even if there is some neat trick that allows this salt to be stored in
> such a way that the original cleartext cannot be recovered in polynomial
> time, this storage is still a security violation, precisely because you
> can use the salt in that form to successfully authenticate. (It would be
> like a Unix machine accepting the hash of a password for authentication --
> the whole point of hashing would be circumvented since anyone could have
> read that out of /etc/passwd.)
Nope. The "hashed password" is not an acceptable response to the
challenge. And the challenge and response may be further encrypted using
preset out-of-band information, making it difficult even to recover the
challenge. See the Kerberos doc.s for a better explanation. It works.
Further discussion in this vein ought to take place elsewhere.
Mark H. Wood, Lead System Programmer mwood@IUPUI.Edu
MS Windows *is* user-friendly, but only for certain values of "user".