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> <email@example.com> wrote:
>> Please test. p.
> It works, but needs to adjustement to the master ACL. My basic
> configuration yield me this at OTP bind on replica:
> ldap_sasl_interactive_bind_s: Bad parameter to an ldap routine (-9)
> replica slapd logs:
> conn=1001 op=0 RESULT tag=103 err=50 text=
> SASL [conn=1001] Failure: Error putting OTP secret
> send_ldap_result: conn=1001 op=0 p=3
> send_ldap_result: err=80 matched="" text="SASL(-1): generic failure:
> Error putting OTP secret"
> This has been fixed on the master, by adding this at the beginning of
> the ACL:
> access to * attrs=cmusaslsecretOTP
> by dn.regex="cn=replica,o=test" write stop
> by * break
This is orthogonal to the sasl auxprops discussion. It's a matter of
well-configuring the authorizing identity in slapo-chain(5).
> Another point: bind on the replica is impossible when the master is
> down. I understand this is to prevent replaying the same OTP on multiple
> replicas, but that defeats the purpose of setting up replicas for fail
This was clearly pointed out at the beginning of the discussion. You
can't have both, it should be clear.
> What about making the behavior configurable?
Right now, cmusaslsecretOTP is hardcoded, because if the shadow copy is
used, OTP breaks. If it is acceptable to have it broken, we can remove
the hardcoding, and let admins decide whether they prefer fail-over over
consistency. I'd have no doubt, and favor consistency.