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Re: [ldapext] password policy: delayed failures



Jim Willeke wrote:
Just a comment on our experiences with LDAP server delays on failed bind attempts.

We have encountered issues with applications when there is a delay between
failed attempts.
When there is an delay, the application is left waiting for a response from
the server.

This was the case with Novell's eDirectory for many years, there was a fixed
delay, and due to this condition, Novell added a feature to make the delay
adjustable.

If the delay is 3 seconds and five people in a row fail there password, the
application can only handle 5 people in 15 seconds, which is an eternity in
our context.
If the return code is returned immediately, then the application can end the
LDAP session immediately and move on to the next operation.

Part of the problem is that LDAP lacks any means of distinguishing client requests from server requests. Ideally we would have a Bind variant that can be used in an already authenticated session that simply checks credentials, but doesn't alter the session's already established credentials. Then 3rd party apps that routinely perform authentication on behalf of other users could use this new Bind mechanism and deal with the failures themselves.

In the absence of such a DSP-style Bind, we can still use Compare operations. This is the approach we're taking to link SASL Binds to ppolicy, and also to manage ppolicy when Samba uses an LDAP backend. But as a general solution it's still pretty poor. (In both the SASL and Samba case, the credential is fully evaluated outside the directory. The result is reflected back into the ppolicy machinery by using the Compare operation with ppolicy control attached. When the credentials match, the Compare uses the current value of the userPassword attribute in its assertion, so that the ppolicy state machine will record a successful authentication. When the credentials don't match, the Compare uses some bogus value, so that ppolicy will record a failure.)

Also, features like this are obviously optional. If you have a directory server that is routinely being used by applications, then you probably want to isolate it from arbitrary clients, and not even deploy any lockout/delay features at all.

-jim
Jim Willeke


On Wed, Jun 30, 2010 at 4:28 PM, Kurt Zeilenga <Kurt.Zeilenga@isode.com
<mailto:Kurt.Zeilenga@isode.com>> wrote:


    On Jun 30, 2010, at 11:39 AM, Howard Chu wrote:

     > Kurt Zeilenga wrote:
     >> I'm updating Isode's password policy implementation and have a few
     >> thoughts
     > on the ppolicy I-D that might be worth some discussion. I'll post each
    issue
     > in a separate thread...
     >>
     >> This message discusses delaying authentication failures
     >>
     >> This seems something not terribly specific to password-based
     >> authentication
     > so not clear it really belongs in the password policy.
     >
     > Maybe not. The reason it's been brought up here is because the account
    lockout feature is already in the password policy draft, and there are
    obvious DoS problems with account lockout, which delaying would help mitigate.

    I recall noting that account locking should be separated as well...

    I'm not sure how delaying bind failures significantly mitigates account
    lockout DoS attacks.  That is, so an attack takes a few more seconds, not
    much mitigation there.  Or am I missing something?

     >
     >> There needs to be a security consideration stated that server implementors
     > need to take precautions to avoid creating DoS attack vectors when
     > implementing delayed responses.
     >
     > Is that really a security consideration? That's like saying server
    implementors need to take precautions against SEGV when implementing
    something.

    It's fairly typical for RFCs to note specific instances where care might
    be taken, especially where the instance is non-obvious.  This might well
    be viewed as obvious and one could argue the reader's limited attention
    should be consumed by more significant concerns.

    I'm fine with leaving inclusion of such a consideration to your and your
    co-authors discretion.


     >
     >> It's not clear whether by "first failed authentication attempt" is per
     > session or per account. If per account, I think there's a problem that
    there's
     > no state mechanism for non-accounts. A non-account would likely get a flat
     > delay (the minimum). The difference in delay could be used by an
    attacker to
     > determine which accounts existed or not. Per session might be more
    sensible.
     >
     > That's a good point about non-accounts. But I don't see how per-session
    will be of much use; the password attacks I see against my machines come
    from multiple IP addresses at once, and frequently a single IP address is
    only used once in any given attack incident.

    Well, I think where a delay is useful, a flat delay is good enough.

    I've been considering a number of attacks scenarios, some based on what
    I've seen against actual LDAP services, some I've seen against other
    services (such as web, ssh services), and some just considering how I
    would mount such an attack if I was so inclined.   In many of these
    scenarios, the delay seems to be little hinderance to the attack.

    One interesting thing to note that if one's site were getting hit by a
    brute force attack where one session one used per session, by turning on a
    delay, the brute force attack will likely become a service DoS attack
    (independent of the attacker's intent).

     >> To defend against brute force attack within a single session, I think it
     >> be
     > better for servers to implement a few basic things than deal with delay
    (which
     > often open to DoS attack vectors). One, detect improper pipelining of Bind
     > requests and drop session if that's the case. Two, have the server
    limit the
     > number of consecutive password-based Bind failures allowed on session. An
     > issue here is that some (non-attack) clients might actually be designed to
     > improper pipelining and/or do only bind requests (such as an client
    providing
     > authentication services for some application).
     >
     > That sounds sensible, but I believe single attack per session is the
    more common case, and these suggestions don't help there.

    Does the delay actually hinder the most common cases?

    I think we need to worry more about the sophisticated attack, as they will
    become common eventually.

     >
     >> Another issue is 'resets on successful authentication'. 'resets on
     > successful non-anonymous authentication' would be better.
     >
     > We can say that but I'm not sure it's a valid distinction. E.g.,
    password-less Binds succeed, but they do not authenticate.

    Well, I wasn't trying to split hairs here.   My point is more that without
    qualification it likely that some implementor will reset on any successful
    Bind.

     >> Personally, I think the min/max stuff is overly complicated. I think a
     > simple flat delayed response is for than sufficient to hinder brute-force
     > attack and doesn't suffer from the risk that different delays could be
    tied to
     > different cases and hence lead to inappropriate disclosure of information.
     >
     > OK. It's a valid point, and we may need to scrap the min/max stuff.
    Alternatively, it could be per-session instead of per-account, but I think
    per-session controls are of very limited usefulness.

    I favor a flat delay.

     >
     > --
     >  -- Howard Chu
     >  CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
     >  Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
     >  Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
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--
  -- Howard Chu
  CTO, Symas Corp.           http://www.symas.com
  Director, Highland Sun     http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
  Chief Architect, OpenLDAP  http://www.openldap.org/project/
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