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Re: [ldapext] draft-behera-ldap-password-policy - operational attrs



I suppose I should note that I have intentionally omitted pwdReset from the attributes that require NO-USER-MODIFICATION.
This is due to the fact that I believe an administrator should be able to modify this value at their discretion to force a user to change their password.


Andrew Sciberras.

Ludovic Poitou wrote:
I also agree.

Ludovic.

Andrew Sciberras wrote:

Hi

Jim Sermersheim wrote:

While I worry a bit about your implementation (though it's not really my place to), I agree with your final assessment, we should change these to NO-USER-MODIFICATION.
Anyone disagree?



This sounds alright to me.
Since we're actually making some the the state attributes NO-USER-MODIFICATION, perhaps we should look at the others as well.
I'm thinking that pwdAccountLockedTime, pwdFailureTime and pwdPolicySubentry should also be included in this list.


Jim



Andrew.


>>> Howard Chu <hyc@highlandsun.com> 4/26/05 8:41 AM >>> I kept meaning to raise this question, but it seems to have fallen thru the cracks. For the OpenLDAP implementation, I needed to change these operational attributes to NO-USER-MODIFICATION: pwdChangedTime, pwdGraceUseTime, and pwdHistory

We have a problem because of the way we process a password change - if a
user is changing their own password, that Modify request is performed
using the user's identity. To do bookkeeping on the above operational
attributes, we internally append some modify operations to the user's
Modify request, and then the augmented request is passed down to the
usual Modify processing. One other factor in our implementation is that
user-modifiable attributes are subject to ACL checks, non-modifiable
attributes are not. So, userPassword is user-modifiable, and typically
users are given permission to write their own password. But they
shouldn't have permission to write the above three attributes, because
then they can just bypass a lot of the policies that rely on those
attributes.

So with the default definitions, we have a problem because the user may
have permission to update the userPassword attr, but no permissions to
the other attrs.

Alternatively we can break things up into two separate Modify
operations, doing the user's original request and then using system
privileges to handle the bookkeeping, but I'm not keen on that approach.
It introduces some lag in a replication scenario, where the password
change itself will get replicated separately from the bookkeeping update.


Fundamentally I believe NO-USER-MODIFICATION is appropriate for these
attributes. Issues with our implementation can be worked around, but I'd
rather clear this up regardless.

--
-- Howard Chu
Chief Architect, Symas Corp. Director, Highland Sun
_http://www.symas.com <http://www.symas.com/>_ _http://highlandsun.com/hyc_
Symas: Premier OpenSource Development and Support


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