|
Sure, but I still don't want to define two attributes for the same state information. If replicating it seems appropriate, then defining it as not-DSA Specific is the right thing to do, but beyond that, it feels like an implementation issue as to whether and how quickly it's replicated.
>>> Ludovic Poitou <Ludovic.Poitou@Sun.COM> 2/24/05 7:25:29 AM >>> Jim, I tend to agree with you. But I also see the point of Howard. X.500 and LDAP both define different types of Operational Attributes: DSA Specific and Directory Operation with specific semantic with regards to the consistence of the attribute value in replicated systems. Defining an operational attribute and letting implementation (or administrator) decide if it'll be replicated or not is actually messing with the distinctions between the various operational types. Ludovic. Jim Sermersheim wrote: > Regarding replication, I favor allowing implementations to solve their > own consistency problems. A highly usable implementation would allow > for any state attribute to be configured for different levels of > replication consistency (from "never replicated", to whatever the > highest level of consistency available is). This way the admin can > decide how consistently the state data is replicated. > I guess what I'm saying is that I see this as a replication problem in > general, and would rather not solve this level of replication problems > in the password policy I-D by defining multiple sets of attributes and > specifying different grades of replication requirements for each. I do > think it's reasonable to address problems of loose consistency which > is what caused the use of time to be used for things like failure count. > Jim > > >>> Howard Chu < hyc@highlandsun.com > 2/23/05 9:11:53 PM >>> > John McMeeking wrote: > > > I've had some recent requests for some sort of "last login time" > attribute > > or a "unused account" policy so that accounts can be disabled if > they have > > not been used for 6 months. Would either of these be appropriate for the > > password policy draft? > > Both of those sound like good things to have, and it does seem to tie in > to the rest of the password policy features. There would still be > replication issues here. > > It seems to me that one solution to these replicated state attributes > may be to define a second set of attributes - one that is DSA-specific, > never implicitly replicated, and another one that serves as an aggregate > for a collection of servers. Then one can specify policies for each set > independently, e.g., "number of failed attempts" on a single DSA vs > across the network. Sites that require total accountability could set a > policy implementing counts across all replicas, other sites that want to > avoid the overhead of maintaining centralized counts could set a policy > using only dsa-specific attributes. > > -- > -- Howard Chu > Chief Architect, Symas Corp. Director, Highland Sun > _http://www.symas.com < http://www.symas.com/ >_ > _http://highlandsun.com/hyc_ > Symas: Premier OpenSource Development and Support > > _______________________________________________ > Ldapext mailing list > _Ldapext@ietf.org < mailto:Ldapext@ietf.org >_ > _https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ldapext_ > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >_______________________________________________ >Ldapext mailing list > Ldapext@ietf.org > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ldapext > > -- Ludovic Poitou Directory Architect. Directory Server Group, Grenoble, France Sun Microsystems Inc. Sun Microsystems requires the following notice: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ NOTICE: This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
_______________________________________________ Ldapext mailing list Ldapext@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ldapext