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Re: [ldapext] Kerberos Integrity behavior



I've been asked a question about the correctness of a particular server's
behavior with respect to LDAP messages and GSSAPI messages when Kerberos
integrity and confidentiality is used.  Can anyone comment on this?

A particular server appears to be sending both search response and
completion messages (i.e. multiple LDAP messages) in a single GSSAPI
message.  Other servers we have tested send a single LDAP message in each
GSSAPI message.

Are both of these behaviors correct?

I suspect so. I've implemented the server side of the SASL/GSSAPI
encryption for LDAP (I think you're really talking about SASL here, but one of the
few SASL mechanisms that supports encryption is GSSAPI).


In my implementation I allowed for all the unaligned PDU combinations
(two or more LDAP PDUs in a SASL PDU; one LDAP PDU that
is larger than a SASL PDU; LDAP PDUs that straddle the beginning
and end of the SASL PDU). When I read the RFCs, I concluded that
there was insufficient detail to completely guide an implementation,
so I opted to handle all the resonable cases I could think of.

Coalescing the search result and the search result done PDUs
into a single TCP segment is a common optimization in LDAP
servers: it improves performance quite a bit for searches that
only yield one entry. In a server with that optimization, I wouldn't
be surprised if it were to send the two PDUs in one SASL message,
especially if the SASL encryption was done as a layer underneath
the existing I/O.



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