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Re: comments: draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-05.txt



Kurt,

  I have taken into account your comments in a new draft which I will be submitting shortly. But there are a couple of points I disagree with (or don't fully understand). See below.

Rob


"Kurt D. Zeilenga" wrote:
> 
> The syntax of controlType should be LDAPOID and have
> the value of the assigned OID.

  That's part of the control spec of RFC 2251 (section 4.1.12), not something that can be defined by an individual control.

> 
> I suggest you add a statement that servers recognizing this
> control MUST return an error if the control is not marked
> as being critical.

  The draft defines the syntax of the control, including the required criticality. I don't think this case is different from any others - the server should reject invalid syntax.


> "This means that fewer results, or no results, may be returned"
> I assume you meant fewer entry and references responses, not
> results.

  Search results consist of entries and references.


> 5. Security Considerations
> 
> A more detailed security analysis may be appropriate.  In
> particular of dangers of using this control in environments
> without appropriate integrity and confidentiality protections
> The risk of a control being added/modified/removed in transit
> should be briefly discussed.

  If the control is used in an environment where it's contents can be altered by an intruder, the intruder can do much worse things than add/alter/remove a proxied auth control. The intruder can change the results returned by the request (including making it fail altogether or succeed where it wouldn't have otherwise) by adding/altering/removing the control, but it could do so by adding/altering/removing any other part of the request as well. An intruder can't grab proxy rights for himself/herself without being an authentication identity entitled to proxy rights. So I think the integrity issues are covered with the text in the draft:

"The Proxied Authorization Control method is subject to standard LDAP
security considerations. The control may be passed over a secure as
well as over an insecure channel."

  I'm adding a sentence about the control including an additional identity, which may be of concern in some environments.