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Re: Protocol: control specifications.
Jim Sermersheim writes:
>>>> Hallvard B Furuseth <email@example.com> 12/29/03 12:40:56 PM
>> After thinking a bit more about this, I believe [Protocol] should
>> require protocolViolation if the required criticality of a supported
>> control is violated. That will teach programmers who use a server
>> which does support the control, to write programs which will work
>> right when moving to a server which does not support the control.
>> For example, the No-Op control, which prevents the effects of update
>> operations, has criticality TRUE. It would be rather unfortunate to
>> run a program which uses it with criticality FALSE against a server
>> which does not support the control.
> I would rather take the less limiting approach, and place this kind of
> imperative in the control specification(s).
OK if control specifications are required to say how the server should
behave in this respect. But I get the impression that this is the
alternative which Kurt likes least...
Would making this the default be an acceptable compromise? That is,
[Protocol] could say "Unless the control specification says otherwise,
the server should return protocolViolation if the required criticality
of a supported control is violated."